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IRISH COMMUNICATIONS REVIEW VOL 1 1991 
Glasnost' 1990 
John Murray 
It is now five years since Mikhail Gorbachev introduced the policy of 'glasnost" to 
the Soviet media. During that period the changes In the content of the Soviet press 
have been enormous. Soviet journalists are now free to write on many of the subjects 
that were de facto taboo under Brezhnev and his predecessors. The gradual opening up 
and expansion of subject matter upon which the Journalist may write has in turn 
resulted ln a stylistic unfettering of the journalistic manner of exposition which is a 
change no less importan t than that of the formal lifting of barriers on previously taboo 
s ubjects. Whereas before glasnost' the source of much of what was written In the 
Soviet press was the language of the Communist party. since 1985, the language of the 
Soviet press has drawn from a far wider associative field. The combination of new 
content and language has transformed the face of Soviet journalism. 
Since the introduction of glasnost' in 1985, It Is clear tha t there have been 
several stages in the development of the process. In this article, an attempt will be 
made to divide very roughly the stages of glasnost' Into three periods. The first begins 
in 1985, after the April plenary session of the Central Committee. when the policy of 
glasnost' was Introduced formally. This period. which lasted until the beginning of 
1988, was marked by the gradual realization among journalists that glasnost' was 
more than yet another empty rhetorical statement Issued by an in-coming General 
Secretary. and was in fact supported by Gorbachev and other progressive elements 
within the leadership. A second phase in the evolution of glasnost' was discernible 
early In 1988 when the press began to feel Its s trength and lose its fear of the 
conservative elements In the leadership who regularly expressed In a threatening 
manner their discontent with the destructive nature of glasnost' . Finally. the third 
phase began In August 1990 with the passing of the Law on the Press. which gave the 
press a legal protection from Party Interference and abolished the State censorship 
agency. GlavUt. 
In this article the divisions between the three different stages of glasnost' are 
made primarUy on the basts of opinions of Soviet journalists who have worked In the 
Soviet press during the period under examination (1985-1990). An attempt has also 
been made to distinguish various phases of glasnost' by reference to what In retrospect 
appear to be watershed events in the fate of the press over the period and subsequent 
retrospective deduction of the significance of these events on the evolution of glasnost'. 
However. because of the absence of a clear knowledge of how various bodies within the 
Communist Party have s haped, or attempted to s hape. the face of the press under 
Gorbachev. one is forced to look at external manifestations of Party Interference In the 
workings of the press in order to establish their role. At best. then, the picture of the 
evolution of glasnost' that will emerge from this article is a combination of the 
subjective vlews of Soviet journalists and the author's own subjective Interpretation of 
the significance of events that seem to have had an Important bearing on the fate of the 
press. 
According to Alexander Pumpiansky (1990) editor of the foreign affairs weekly 
magazine Noooye vremya (New Times). the Initial phase In the evolution of glasnost' 
(mid 1985-early 1988) was the most Important one. In these first years, alongside the 
publication in journals and books of hitherto forbidden literature, there appeared a 
new type or newspaper and magazine. The publication of books such as Andrei 
Platonov's Kollovan (Foundation Pit) and Vasily Grossman's Sud'ba i zhizn (Life and 
Fate}. coincided with the appearance of the unrecognizably revamped periodicals. 
Moscow News and Ogonek (Little Fire), soon to become the cutting edge of glasnost'. 
Before glasnost'. both Moscow News and Ogonek- one a weekly newspaper. the other a 
weekly magazine - had been paragons of what in Russian is referred to as 'paradnaya 
literaturnaya', or writing with the intent of promoting a falsely positive picture of life 
and events In the Soviet Union. Moscow News (owned by the Novosti Press Agency and 
the Union of Societies of Friendship and Cultural Links with Foreign Countries, and 
printed in five langu ages, including Russian) was aimed primarily at a foreign 
readership. Its intention and even function. as was that of the Novosti Press Agency. 
was to portray to the foreign reader a one-sided image of Soviet life. 
One former employee of NovosU under Breshnev. Ivan Zakharov (1990), who in 
1990 became deputy editor of a new newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta (The 
Independent Newspaper). said quite open ly that he used to work in 'foreign 
propaganda'. Having trans ferred from a foreign propaganda agency to a newspaper 
which claimed to be in the vanguard of 'progressive' journalism. Zakharov described 
his previous work as a journalist under Brezhnev: 
For 13 years I worked for magazines and newspapers published 
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by lhe NovosU organisation which were for foreign consumption. I 
may not have told the whole truth all the time, but I consoled myself 
with lhe thought that I was writing for foreigners and they had a 
choice of Information, other than the Soviet Weekly. (Zakharov, 
1990). 
The editor of Ogonek, Vitaly Korotich (1988), explained that before the advent of 
glasnost' his magazine had been 'simply uninteresting', and that 'nobody believed what 
was written in It'. According to Korotich. the surge in popularity of Ogonek in the first 
stage of glasnost' was due In large part to the publication of articles dealing with 
victims of Stalin's terror. such as Bukharln and Raskolnlkov. Korotich explained that 
the magazine received 'enormous· public support' for articles dealing with what might 
be called retrospective glasnost' because of 'the great yearning for justice among the 
people' (Korotich. 1988). 
During this early period of glasnost', according to Pumplansky (1990), there was 
still 'very limited freedom of the press' and publications such as Moscow News and 
Ogonek were seen by the public and the journalistic community as 'testing voices'. The 
publication of each new issue containing revelations from the past was accompanied 
by a fear among the journalistic community that the as yet undefined limits of 
glasnost' had been over-reached. In other words, in the absence of any legally laid-
down code preventing Communist Party interference in the workings of the press. the 
majority of journalists stood on the sidelines waiting to see how far the more daring 
newspapers and magazines would go before their editors were removed. This author, 
for example, can recall rumours circulating In Moscow all through 1987 that 'they've 
removed Korotich' ('synaU Koroticha'). Perhaps an even more Important factor that 
checked the expansion of glasnost' at this time was the scepticism among Soviet 
journalists that the incipient liberalizing political climate was going to last. 
Yet even at this early stage. the new limits of permissiveness. once broached with 
impunity by one publication. were established by other newspapers and magazines as 
territory gained. This early period of glasnost' might be described figuratively as a 
piecemeal journalistic occupation of previously forbidden territory. Once a certain 
previously taboo topic had been touched upon by one publication and Its editor still 
remained In place. then other editors from other publications took courage and 
followed suit. Yegor Yakovlev, editor of Moscow News. gave an example of this: 
Let us say that previously our press never wrote about 
prostitutes. Now, however. one paper has written about them and It's 
a case of let's all write about this. and with a special passion 
(Yakovlev. 1987). 
During this early period of glasnost'. opposition to the new policy came from 
Within the Politburo and the Party's Central Committee SecretariaL Before the 1988 
reorganization of the Secretariat, the most Important figure In the Politburo after the 
General Secretary. had been traditionally the Secretary for Ideology. Under Gorbachev. 
however, the early evolution of glasnost' took place in spite of the Ideology Secretary. 
Yegor Llgachev. Before his removal from the Politburo at the XXVIII Party Congress 
(August 1990). Llgachev was still speaking of 'excesses of glasnost', warning that 
perestroika should be about 'creation - not negation' (see Irish Times. 22 July 1989 and 
Economist, 5-11 July 1989). This was and remained throughout the period under 
examination the main argument against glasnost" of lhe conservative wing of the Party. 
In the early stages of glasnost' it caused more concern and worry to editors and 
individual journalists than it did in 1990. by which time the gains established in the 
earlier two periods had been solidified. During the inaugural stage of glasnost'. 
however. it became slowly evident that the policy of allowing the press greater freedom 
to write critically was sponsored by the General Secretary. Gorbachev. His frequent 
meetings With representatives of the press (Vstrecha. 1987). showed the Journalistic 
community that he was Interested In the press, though some thought too interested. 
Llgachev's known opposition to glasnost' was counter-balanced by the active support 
for the new policy of the former Secretary for Propaganda. Alexander Yakovlev. known 
by the Western media In Moscow as 'Mr. Perestrioka'. Pumpiansky describes his 
interpretation of the stale of play at the time: 
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There were different reactions to the early manifestations of 
glasnost'. The Party apparatus. for instance, was also (along with 
journalists themselves) surprised by the new press. and, to a certain 
extent. surprised at its own liberalism. "Look how much we can 
tolerate !' And the reaction of the Party apparatus. of which the most 
prominent figure was Llgachev. was specific. From time to time the;y 
shou ted and banged their fists. demanded people answer for 
publishing certain things. but It must be said that they didn't receive 
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the necessary support. because Gorbachev or Yakovlev. well. maybe 
Yakovlev was in a position to give a hint that he held a different 
position. but none the less. the actual support was varied. For 
example, Party conservatives got upset by different manifestations of 
journalistic glasnost', but nothing happened as a result. The heads of 
editors did not fly. So, It turned out that Yakovlev and Gorbachev 
had been supporting the press In a quiet way, not allowing the 
conservatives to translate their anger Into practical action. However. 
on the verbal level. It still looked like the situation was being 
controlled by the conservatives. In any event, they could stamp their 
feet and bang their fists as much as they wanted. And It seemed that 
It was they who were controlling the situation. whereas In fact that 
was no longer the case. But this only became clear later. In lime 
(Pumplansky.l990). 
The perception around the end of 1987 that glasnost' was more than just a 
liberal blip permitted by an Inexperienced new leader gradually became clearer so that 
In September of the following year the editor of Ogonek. Vitaly Korotich, could say that 
· ... today, for the first time ever. the conservatives are on the defensive. They are in the 
minority and this is very significant.' (Korotich. 1988). 
The second phase of glasnost'. which began around 1988 and finished In 1990. 
became apparent when editors and readers saw that avant-garde publications such as 
Ogonek and Moscow News had not been shut down and were there to stay. 
Pumplansky. again, explains : 
lf in U1e frrst phase each new issue appeared to be a surprise, 
in the second phase. this became the norm. Everybody came to 
understand that these journals and papers would be the same, and 
that each Issue would not be the last one and that tomorrow's Issue 
would be changed. or that the editor would be replaced. or the 
character of the paper would be changed. In the second phase. 
nothing of the sort (Pumpiansky.l990). 
One of the benchmarks that confirmed the end of the first phase came late in 
1989 when. In what for the time seemed an uncharacteristically Brezhnevian reflex. 
Gorbachev exerted pressure on a prominent journalist to resign (Murray. 1989). 
Vladimir Starkov. editor of the weekly Argumenty i jakty (Arguments and Facts). had 
published the results of a survey measuring the popularity of the country's leading 
political figures in which Gorbachev did not figure in the first ten. After a tense period, 
during which some representatives of the press threatened to go on strike if Starkov 
was forced to resign, Gorbachev backed down. It was after this incident. according to 
Pumpiansky. that the radical press began to 'solidify and feel its strength'. 
Yet this incident had also shown the vulnerability of the press to the mood 
swings of the leadership. especially when the demonology of the glasnost'-inspired 
journalist had begun to stray from the already safe figures of Stalin and Brezhnev to 
the still relatively untouched figures of Gorbachev himself. members of the Politburo. 
and Lenin. The Starkov affair was also a sharp reminder to journalists that no law 
existed guaranteeing the press freedom from such Party meddling. ln theory. at least. 
Gorbachev could have decided at any moment that glasnost' had gone far enough and 
issued instructions outlining the areas of Soviet life which were not to be criticised. 
Older journalists remembered the speed with which Brezhnev had clamped down on 
the freedoms of the press that Krushchev had occasionally permitted. Juridically. then. 
journalists in 1989 had as UtUe protection against Party interference as they had under 
Stalin. 
ln spite of its still juridically precarious position. it was during this second phase 
of glasnost' that the forced conformity of the Soviet press, begun under Lenin. began to 
shatter. This resulted In the phenomenon of different newspapers and magazines 
beginning to show distinctive political aspects. By 1988 It had become clear. for 
instance. that Sovetskaya Rossiya (Soviet Russia) was not only a conservative 
newspaper. but one actively promoting retrograde ideas such as the ending of 
glasnost'. At a plenary session of the formerly monolithic Union of Journalists. a 
speech from V. Chikin. deputy chairperson of that organisation and editor of 
Sovetskaya Rossiya. was criticized from the floor for paying lip-service to glasnost' and 
perestroika. Chikin spoke in favour of media criticism as long as it was 'ideologically 
progressive and spiritually rich in content' and contained ·constructiveness'. He also 
spoke against those newspapers that 'were sowing nihilistic moods' among the readers. 
and whose 'heads had turned' in their attempts to provide the readers with sensational 
stories (Chlk:ln, 1988). While it is true that Chikin's newspaper became a platform for 
those opposed to glasnost' In the press. it is no less true that such a newspaper as his. 
expressing opinions different from those of the General Secretary. could not have 
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existed under any of the previous leaders of the country. One of the maJn achievements 
of glasnost' is the presence in the press of various strands of opinion giving voice to 
different political standpoints. In a sense, the co-existence of newspapers such as 
Sovetskaya Rossiya and the radical Argwnenty i jakty was essential for the further 
development of the press In the Soviet Union. 
Even during the second phase of glasnost', the authorities as well as editors of 
the radical official press still discriminated against unofficial publications. Unofficial 
publications, such as the monthly journal Glasnost' , edited by Sergei Grigoriants, 
were at this time fighting for the right to publish freely. In 1988, Grigoriants was 
arrested and the equipment for his journal destroyed. Yet even the most radically 
oriented official press failed to intercede on behalf of Grigoriants. As late as September 
1988, for example, the editor of Ogonek, Korotich, repeated the official point of view 
regarding the unofficial publications. 
I disagree with the enUre principle of unofficial publications .... 
These unofficial writers ought to try and get published ln the existing 
organs of the press. Soon all these lndependent publications will no 
longer exist. And anyway, they can only produce about fifty copies 
since they use typewriters and carbon paper (Korotich, 1988). 
The differences between the official and unofficial press were still great at this 
period. While the radical official press published material critical of the past and was 
beginning to question the current policies of the leadership. publications such as 
Glasnost' gave voice to material that questioned the very legitimacy of the Soviet Union. 
They represented the still publicly unacceptable voice of the dissident community and 
were regarded as subversive. pandering to Western public opinion and, consequently, 
guilty of treason. While, for instance, Ogonek and Moscow News might publish an 
article condemning the mass repressions in the 1930s as an Instance of 'StalJnist 
lawlessness', the dissident press reminded its readers that most of Stalin's victims 
were convicted of crimes that still remained in Soviet law. While Korotich (1988), spoke 
of the dangers of going too far in retrospective glasnost'. ('If we begin criticizing Lenin. 
then we'll end up destroying the whole temple, beginning with the foundations. I 
believe we have to leave the foundations intact.'), the dissident press gave utterance to 
Its belief that the rot had set in as soon as Lenin and the Bolsheviks took power in 
1917. 
One objection to what the dissident press termed 'official glasnost", was the 
manner (described above by Yakovlev) In which 'official' journalists broached sensltlve 
topics only after they had been written about by the more daring publications, and, 
hence. desensitized. By contrast. the dissident press had a lways been proud of its 
lnsensiUvity to the political mood of the day. 
The most important qualitative change that affected the development of glasnost' 
since 1985 took place in August 1990 with the passing of the long-awaited Law on the 
Press by the Soviet Parliament. What we have called the thtrd stage of glasnost' began 
with the passing of this law. While the existence of a new law in itself did not guarantee 
the freedom of the press - laws can always be repealed or amended-it nevertheless 
provided a legal basis that protected the press from direct Party interference, the main 
impediment to freedom of expression in the Soviet Union. The law states, for example, 
that interference with the professional activities of journalists and even failure by 
officials to supply journalists with necessary Information is an offence. It a lso 
stipulates that as long as a newspaper does not advocate armed revolution, religious 
prejudice or racial persecution and does not reveal any State secrets, anyone is entitled 
to set up a newspaper. magazine or news service by registering with the authorities. 
However. In 1990, the Party still retained control over a large part of the 
publishing industry, and, in this way. indirect control over the non-Party press. The 
former editor of Moskovskaya pravda, Mikhail Poltoranin, pointed out that eighty per 
cent of the newspapers in the country were owned by the Communist Party 
(Dobbs, 1990). A Moskovskie Novostl journa list was unhappy that the State still 
determined the allocation of paper to newspapers and compared the new law to the 
emancipation of the serfs In 1861: 
'The serfs were liberated, but they had been given freedom 
without land',. (Kabakov, 1990). 
Because the powers of the Party and the State In 1990 were still Intertwined, the 
Party still effectively retained control over the allocation of paper to the press and thus 
remained a potent force in checking the development of a free press in the Soviet 
Union. A new system of allocation was proposed for 1991. according to which the State 
would sell a certaJn amount of paper to registered newapapers at a relatively cheap 
price while any extra paper would have to be bought at 'commercial' prices, which, in 
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light of ever-present and mysterious paper shortages in the most heavily afforested 
country in the world. were set to rise in price threefold from January 1991. So. by the 
end of 1990. the paper shortage and the cost of paper at non-State. 'commercial' prices 
had become the most pressing concern for non -Party or State affiliated papers. In the 
words of Poltoranin, the passing of the August 1990 Press Law 'politically opens up 
great possibilities for the Soviet press. but economically. the possibilities are limited' 
(Dobbs. 1990). 
Because of the Party's continuing grip on the State planning mechanism. 
Gosplan, official newspapers that become radicalized In the first two stages of glasnost' 
and wanted to register under the new law In 1990 as independent organs shrank from 
the ultimate step of disassociating themselves fully from their official sponsors. One 
example was the Moscow daily. Moskovsky komsomolets (The Moscow Komsomol). 
which. with a 1.5 million daily print-run. was in 1990 the largest-selling daily in the 
capital. The journalists and editor of the newspaper decided collectively to remain an 
organ of their sponsors. the Moscow City Committee of the Komsomol because, on the 
one hand, It gave the paper. In the words of one of Its staff 'a certain status and 
guarantee of stability 1f anything should happen', and. on the other hand, provided a 
guarantee of a favourable allotment of paper at State prices. 
Pumpiansky of Novoye vremya summarized the position of the press at the end of 
1990 thus: 
Over the past yea r [19901. the press has become extremely 
radi ca lized. The c irculation of Komsomolskaya pravda and 
Argumenty ifakty has leapL The left press has felt Its strength. Then 
in August the Law on the Press was passed anci censors hip was 
abolished. juridically, while at the same time it became clear that the 
Party apparatus had collapsed. Llgachev was no more and It was no 
longer clear what the Ideological Department of the Communist Party 
was doing. In any event, It was clear that they had no relation to the 
everyday life of newspapers and magazines. except. maybe, Party 
papers. which. Incidentally. are dotng the worst and losing the most 
readers. So. you may not have noticed. but we're almost a free press 
now, or we have one foot in the side of a free press. Nobody Is afraid 
any more of the conservatives shouting. or the Party leadership. If 
there are any worries. they are completely different to those we had 
before. Now our worries are about existing In the market place, about 
the price and availability of paper, money. finance. competition and 
becoming commercially viable. because. naturally, we have to make 
money, and think of producing a quality product. Our worries are on 
a completely new level. 
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